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Around the world, many countries have been establishing specialist environmental courts and 
tribunals, with enthusiastic support in much of the academic literature.  Yet in the jurisdictions 
where they have perhaps been most strongly developed, the acceptability of such courts continues 
to come under criticism.  It is this mismatch which lies behind Warnock’s attempt to identify an 
underlying theory that justifies the legitimacy of specialist environmental adjudication. 
 
Her answer is that the legitimacy of environmental courts should be seen as resting on a legal 
integrity that responds to the inherent nature of the problems they are charged with resolving.  The 
case for their acceptance is based on coupling the formal legitimacy derived from the courts being 
created and operating under established legal rules with a responsiveness to the task to be 
undertaken.  This argument is developed with examples from across the world, drawing especially 
on the rich experience of the New Zealand Environment Court and the new South Wales Land and 
Environment Court. 
 
What makes environmental issues so special that they require a distinct approach to adjudication?  
Several features are put forward: the dynamic nature of ecosystems, the unavoidable scientific 
uncertainty, the polycentricity of problems, the different sorts of impacts of (physical, economic, 
socio-cultural) on many parties who additionally may not share the same world-view (ethical 
pluralism).  Such features mean that cases do not lend themselves to decision-making based on 
definite rules, so that no clear and fixed law-policy divide can be maintained.  Furthermore, the 
resolution of disputes often requires forward-looking decisions governing an evolving situation, 
where human intervention (including through the courts) is one of the factors shaping the position.  
Environmental adjudication is thus “a completely different species” from other forms of public law 
activity. 
 
Environmental courts, Warnock argues, cannot work in the same way as other courts due to these 
special features of environmental issues.  In assessing factual situations their role requires an 
assessment of risk, where both the likelihood and seriousness of consequences must be taken into 
account, rather than judging on the basis of a balance of probabilities as many other courts can.  
Creativity is required in finding ways of gathering and assessing evidence of the uncertain and 
dynamic picture and in engaging all the parties with an interest in the matters.  Moreover, much 
environmental legislation in itself poses specific challenges, relying on principles and broad 
objectives, without containing precise rules on how these are to be operationalised in particular 
circumstances. 
 
There are critics of specialist courts, but it is argued that many of these are judging them against 
inappropriate standards.  The fact that the courts’ role can be seen as part administrative and part 
judicial is not a novelty – until last century many governmental bodies had such dual roles (the 
historic role of swanimotes in English forests is provided as one example) – and arguments that this 
offends against the separation of powers are misplaced in jurisdictions like the UK and those that 
have followed its model where a rigid separation is not a core feature of the constitutional set-up.  
Instrumentalist criticisms, arguing that decisions could be made more quickly and efficiently by other 
bodies and procedures, miss the point by failing to respect the nature of environmental decision-
making.  
 
Doubts over specialist environmental courts, it is argued, can be addressed through several stages:  
identifying the distinct characteristics of environmental problems, acknowledging the challenge 
these pose for law and dispute resolution, developing legal principles, procedures and remedies that 
respond to this challenge and understanding how the forms and procedures for adjudication can 
address these challenges.  On this basis a foundation for environmental adjudication can be 
constructed that establishes the legitimacy of specialist environmental courts. 
 
This strong argument for the creation and maintenance of environmental courts is particularly timely 
for Scottish readers.  The review of environmental governance mandated by the UK Withdrawal 
from the European Union (Continuity) Act 2021 expressly calls for consideration of “whether and, if 
so, how the establishment of an environmental court could enhance … governance arrangements” 
(s.41(2)(c)).  The next few years will therefore see renewed debate on this topic, which has not been 
done justice in previous government reviews (see (2016) 174 SPEL 26).  
 
The book, in particular, calls on us to focus on what tasks any such court might be called on to fulfil.  
The detailed examination of the experience of the New Zealand and New South Wales courts 
emphasises that their role includes consideration of the merits of cases, not just the legality of 
decisions taken by regulators.  They are therefore doing a job that here is often in the hands of 
Ministers or planning reporters, leaving the courts with a much more limited (and it could be argued 
more conventionally “judicial” role).  The debate to be had is therefore as much about function as 
form, which is central to the responsiveness that is argued for in this book. 
 
That debate will be enriched not only by Warnock’s own argument but also by an understanding of 
the wider picture that she provides so well.  This comes directly from her discussion of the 
antipodean jurisprudence and indirectly through the wealth of references to both the practical 
experience elsewhere and the conceptual debates that continue to surround environmental law and 
adjudication.  This book is an excellent and stimulating way to prompt thinking about a big subject 
that will be very much a live issue in the coming years. 
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